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Abstract: 
 
Over the past forty-five years, America has fallen victim to an obesity epidemic, 
affecting more than thirty percent of American adults. If the incidence of obesity 
continues at current rates, an estimated forty-percent of Americans will be obese 
by 2018. Despite its widespread prevalence, treatment is limited to lifestyle 
modification, surgery, and pharmacotherapy. With lifestyle modification proven 
to be largely ineffective, surgical options reserved only for the severely obese, and 
only one long-term drug on the market, there is a vacuum in obesity treatment 
options. Moreover, the Food and Drug Administration recently rejected three 
promising drugs. In this paper, I review the obesity problem facing America and 
describe the history of anti-obesity pharmaceuticals. After examining the three 
recently rejected drug applications, I bring to light FDA’s new priorities and offer 
an alternative framework for thinking about pharmacology to guide anti-obesity 
drug development and review. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
With FDA’s rejection of Contrave’s new drug application (NDA), the third anti-obesity 
drug rejected in the past nine months, the Internet was ablaze with predictions that the anti-
obesity pharmaceutical market was effectively dead. Some incensed critics alleged that FDA 
didn’t care enough about obese Americans to let innovative new drugs come to the market. An 
exploration of the history of the anti-obesity pharmaceutical market in the US, however, leads 
one to the opposite conclusion. FDA’s hesitancy to approve a new drug is a manifestation of the 
agency’s deep concern over patient safety. And given the history of FDA-approved anti-obesity 
drugs that turned out to be harmful, including Meridia, which was withdrawn from the market in 
October 2010, it’s hard to say that their concern is not well founded. In this paper, I will provide 
an overview of the obesity problem today in order to illustrate why a solution is urgently needed. 
Then, I will describe the history of anti-obesity pharmaceuticals in the US, paying particular 
attention to instances where FDA ultimately turned out to be wrong about the safety and efficacy 
of an approved drug. Next, I will chronicle three promising anti-obesity pharmaceuticals whose 
new drug applications (NDAs) were rejected in rapid succession over the past nine months. 
Finally, I will discuss the aftermath of non-approval of these NDAs and forecast an alternative 
framework to guide anti-obesity drug development and review. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE OBESITY PROBLEM IN THE US 
a.  DEMOGRAPHICS AND PREVALENCE 
According to the 2008 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), 
seventy-four percent of Americans aged twenty and older are overweight or obese.
1 Of these, 
                                                 
1 Cynthia L. Ogden and Margaret D. Carroll, Prevalence of Overweight, Obesity, and Extreme Obesity Among 
Adults: United States, Trends 1976-1980 Through 2007-2008 (2010).     2 
almost half were considered obese (body mass index [BMI]
2 of thirty or higher).
3 These rates are 
alarming not only for their extreme prevalence among the American population, but also for their 
rapid growth over the past forty-five years. Specifically, while the percentage of overweight 
Americans has not significantly changed since 1976, the prevalence of obesity among adults 
between ages twenty and seventy-four more than doubled between 1976 and 2008.
4 If the current 
obesity trend continues, some studies have estimated that 43% of the U.S. population will be 
obese by 2018.
5 Public health professionals have characterized the situation to be of “epidemic” 
proportions.
6 
The obesity epidemic has a disparate impact on minority communities, especially among 
women. Non-Hispanic black women and Mexican-American women are far more likely (50% 
and 45%, respectively) to be obese than non-Hispanic white women (33%).
7 Evidence also 
suggests disparities along class lines; 15% of children aged two to four year old from low-
income households are obese.
8 The prevalence of obesity varies across the nation. While none of 
the states in 2009 met the 15% obesity target set forth in Healthy People 2010,
 9 obesity rates 
                                                 
2 BMI is a measure of body fat based on height and weight. An adult’s BMI is calculated by dividing her weight in 
kilograms by the square of her height in meters. A normal BMI is between 18.5 and 24.9. An individual is 
considered overweight if her BMI is between 25 and 29.9 and is clinically obese if her BMI is over 30. See Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, Healthy Weight: Assessing Your Weight: About BMI for Adults (2009), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/adult_bmi/index.html. 
3 Ogden, supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
5 United Health Foundation et al., The Future Costs of Obesity: National and State Estimates of the Impact of 
Obesity on Direct Health Care Expense 9 (2009), available at 
http://www.fightchronicdisease.org/pdfs/costofobesityreport-final.pdf. 
6 See, e.g., Youfa Wang and May A. Beydoun, The Obesity Epidemic in the United States—Gender, Age, 
Socioeconomic, Racial/Ethnic, and Geographic Characteristics: A Systematic Review and Meta-Regression 
Analysis, 29 Epidemiological Reviews 6-28 (2007). 
7 Ogden, supra note 1. 
8 National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Obesity: Halting the Epidemic by Making 
Health Easier (2010). 
9 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Healthy People 2010: Nutrition and Overweight 19-11, available at 
http://www.healthypeople.gov/2010/Document/pdf/Volume2/19Nutrition.pdf     3 
across the country ranged from 19% in Colorado to 34% in Mississippi.
10 At least thirty percent 
of people were obese in nine states, up from no states in 2000.
11 
b.  THEORIES BEHIND THE GROWING OBESITY RATES 
The underlying cause of obesity is an imbalance between calories consumed and calories 
burned.  What has changed between the 1960s and the 2000s to prompt such a precipitous 
increase in the prevalence of obesity in the United States? The alarming rise in obesity rates has 
been ascribed to a number of causes. Some point to dietary changes, such as the widespread 
availability of high-calorie foods inside and outside the home,
12 the influence of advertising,
13 
and larger portion sizes.
14 Environmental conditions are also to blame, with individuals’ physical 
activity significantly reduced due to technological advances and the widespread ownership of 
automobiles.
15 The Surgeon General also names genes, metabolism, behavior, environment, and 
culture as also contributing to the problem.
16 
c.  OBESITY’S TOLL: INCREASED MORBIDITY & MORTALITY AND INDIRECT COSTS 
Obesity is a contributing factor in over 112,000 preventable deaths each year.
17 It has 
been linked to other chronic diseases, such as Type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and 
certain types of cancer.
18 Researchers have suggested that an excess production of adipose tissue 
hormones and the resultant decrease in other types of types of tissue hormones is the cause of 
                                                 
10 Vital Signs: State-Specific Obesity Prevalence Among Adults—United States 2009, 59 MMWR (Aug. 3, 2010). 
11 Id. 
12 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, The Surgeon General’s Vision for a Healthy and Fit Nation (2010) 
13 J. Lennert Veerman, et al., By How Much Would Limiting TV Food Advertising Reduce Childhood Obesity?, 19 
European Journal of Public Health 365 (2009). 
14 Samara Joy Nielsen and Barry M. Popkin, Patterns and Trends in Food Portion Sizes, 1977-1998, 289 JAMA 450 
(2008). 
15 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, supra note 12, at 2. 
16 Id. at 4 
17 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services. supra note 12, at 2. 
18 Allison Field, et al., Impact of Overweight on the Risk of Developing Common Chronic Diseases during a 10-
Year Period, 161 Archives of  Internal Medicine 1581 (2001).     4 
these health problems.
19 Moderate obesity (BMI of thirty to thirty-five) reduces life expectancy 
by three years while severe obesity (BMI greater than or equal to forty) can reduce life 
expectancy by up to ten years— a reduction equal to that caused by long-term smoking. 
20 
Obesity also has heavy indirect costs in the form of increased medical expenses and decreased 
productivity.
21 Obese individuals also bear these economic costs personally; obese individuals 
spent $1,400 more in medical costs than non-obese individuals.
22 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT ANTI-OBESITY DRUG MARKET 
The history of anti-obesity drugs in the United States can fairly be characterized by the 
short duration that most approved medications for long-term treatment have been allowed on the 
market. Anti-obesity medications have been available in the United States since at least 1933, 
with the introduction of dinitrophenol (DNP), a cellular metabolic poison that increased 
metabolic rate.
23 DNP was found to increase the risk of fatal hyperthermia,
24 neuropathy, and 
cataracts.
25 Pursuant to its expanded powers under the 1938 Food Drugs and Cosmetics Act, the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pressured manufacturers to withdraw DNP from the 
market that same year.
26 Since 1938, several drugs have been removed from the market because 
                                                 
19 Food and Drug Administration, Transcript of Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee, July 15, 
2010, at 29 (hereinafter Qnexa Advisory Committee Transcript). 
20 Gary Whitlock, et al., Body-Mass Index and Cause-Specific Mortality in 900,000 Adults: Collaborative Analyses 
of 57 Prospective Studies, 373 Lancet 1083 (2009). 
21 Justin G. Trogdon, et al., Indirect Costs of Obesity: a Review of the Current Literature, 9 Obesity Reviews 489 
(2008). 
22 National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Obesity: Halting the Epidemic by Making 
Health Easier (2010), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/resources/publications/aag/pdf/2010/AAG_Obesity_2010_Web_508.pdf. 
23 M.L. Tainter ML, et al., Use of Dinitrophenol in Obesity and Related Conditions: a Progress Report, 101 Journal 
of the American Medical Association 1472 (1933). 
24 R.B. Leftwich, et al., Dinitrophenol Poisoning: a Diagnosis to Consider in Undiagnosed Fever, 75 Southern 
Medical Journal 182 (1982). 
25 John Parascandola, Dinitrophenol and Bioenergetics: an Historical Perspective, 5 Molecular and Cellular 
Biochemistry 69 (1974). 
26 Id.     5 
of serious adverse events,
27 while others have been restricted due to their high potential for 
abuse
28 or serious side effects.
29 Moreover, some drugs have failed to gain approval altogether 
due to FDA’s safety and efficacy concerns.
30 Even among the drugs that have been approved, 
their efficacy is typically limited to a three to six month period, with partial regain of lost weight 
thereafter.
31 
a.  THE CURRENT MARKET 
i.  Phentermine 
FDA first reviewed Phentermine in 1959.
32 Since phentermine is a pre-1962 drug, no 
efficacy trials were required for the NDA to become effective. It was, however, determined to be 
effective as well as safe under the drug efficacy study implementation (DESI) program, 
following enactment of the Drug Amendments of 1962.  
Phentermine is very popular, with over six million prescriptions written for the drug in 
2009.
33 Ninety-seven percent of obesity specialists reported using the drug in their practice, in 
contrast to sixty-four percent of specialists for the next most popular drug (diethylpropion).
34  
  Phentermine is commonly prescribed as a short-term (less than twelve weeks) treatment 
for overweight individuals, in combination with a regimen of exercise and a low-calorie diet.
35 It 
typically causes a four-pound weight loss per four weeks for the first eight to twelve weeks of 
                                                 
27 I.e., aminorex (withdrawn 1965), fenfluramine (withdrawn 1997), phenypropanolamine (withdrawn 2000), 
rimonabant (never approved in the US but withdrawn in Europe in 2009). See Lisa L. Ioannides-Demos, et al., 
Pharmacotherapies for Obesity: Past, Current, and Future Therapies, 2011 Journal of Obesity 1 (2011). 
28 I.e., dexamphetamine, methamphetamine. See Id. 
29 I.e., Fenfluramine (withdrawn 1997), dexfenfluramine (withdrawn 1997), phenylpropanolamine (withdrawn 
2000), sibutramine (withdrawn 2010). See  Id. 
30 E.g., rimonabant, lorcaserin, Qnexa, Contrave. The review process for the latter three drugs will more fully 
discussed below. 
31 Lee M. Kaplan, Pharmacologic Therapies for Obesity, 39 Gastroenterology clinics of North America 69 (2010). 
32 Ioannides-Demos, supra note 27. 
33 Qnexa Advisory Committee Transcript, supra note 19, at 24. 
34 Ed J. Hendricks, et al., How Physician Obesity Specialists Use Drugs to Treat Obesity, 17 Obesity 1730, 1732 
(2009). 
35 National Center for Biotechnology Information, Phentermine, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0000605.     6 
treatment.
36 Side effects can include shortness of breath, chest pain, and vomiting.
37 Since it is 
closely related to amphetamine, a habit-forming drug, most people are only prescribed a three to 
six week course of treatment.
38 Therefore, phentermine is best considered a medication to help 
jump-start weight loss, rather than a long-term tool to manage obesity.  
ii.  Diethylpropion (Tenuate) 
Approved by FDA in 1959, diethylpropion is an anorectant approved for short-term 
obesity treatment. It acts on the central nervous system and raises blood pressure in a manner 
similar to amphetamines. 
39 The drug causes rapid weight loss in the first few weeks and then its 
efficacy tapers off, making it appropriate only for short-term weight loss. Some patients have 
become psychologically dependent on the drug, with extreme fatigue and mental depression 
occurring upon cessation in patients who were administered high doses.
40 Because of its 
cardiovascular effects and the potential of developing pulmonary hypertension, diethylpropion is 
contraindicated in individuals with hypertension or arrhythmias.
41 The cardiovascular effects are 
amplified with extended use of the drug; the use of anorectic agents, such as diethylpropion, for a 
period longer than 3 months has been associated with a twenty-three-fold risk in developing 
pulmonary hypertension. Moreover, it is suspected that diethylpropion, like dexfenfluramine and 
fenfluramine, may be associated with valvular heart disease
42 and primary pulmonary 
hypertension.
43 
                                                 
36 Kaplan, supra note 31. 
37 National Center for Biotechnology Information, Phentermine, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0000605. 
38 Id. 
39 DailyMed, Diethylpropion hcl controlled release, http://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drugInfo.cfm?id=17529. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 M.J. Abramowicz, et al., Primary Pulmonary Hypertension After Amfepramone (Diethylpropion) with BMPR2 
Mutation, 3 European Respiratory Journal 560 (2003).      7 
As is the case with many older drugs approved by FDA, there have not been many 
studies done on diethylpropion and few of these have studied the drug’s long-term use.
44 In one 
recent study of sixty-nine obese adults on a hypocaloric diet, the diethylpropion group lost 9.8% 
of initial body weight after six months compared to a 3.2% reduction in initial body weight 
among subjects taking placebo.
45 The drug’s effectiveness after six months was negligible. 
Subjects taking diethylpropion only lost less than one kilogram in months seven through twelve 
of the study. However, there was no evidence of a link between the drug and primary pulmonary 
hypertension and valvular heart disease.
46The authors of that study surmise that the low level of 
interest in conducting larger studies of the long-term use of diethylpropion is likely due to the 
fact that the drug is no longer under patent and is relatively inexpensive.
47 Given their promising 
results, further larger studies are recommended in order to explore diethylpropion’s long-term 
efficacy, either individually or in combination with other drugs, as well as to further explore its 
cardiovascular safety. 
iii.  Orlistat (Xenical/Alli) 
Orlistat was approved for prescription use in 1999, three years after Hoffman-Laroche 
submitted an NDA for the drug. Delay in the approval process was attributable to FDA concerns 
over orlistat acting as a breast cancer promoter among individuals who take the drug.
48 In May 
1998, FDA issued an approvable letter (meaning that the application is “basically approvable, 
providing certain issues are resolved”),
 49 with approval contingent on the sponsor providing 
follow-up data from its Phase 3b studies focusing on a possible association between orlistat and 
                                                 
44 C. Cercato, et al., A Randomized Double-Blind Placebo-Controlled Study of the Long-Term Efficacy and Safety 
of Diethylpropion in the Treatment of Obese Subjects, 33 International Journal of Obesity 857 (2009). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Food and Drug Administration, Minutes of General Meeting Regarding NDA 20-766, Mar. 31, 1998, available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/99/020766a_xenical_admindocs_corres_P17.pdf. 
49 21 CFR 314.110 (2010).     8 
breast cancer among woman aged forty-five and older.
50 Hoffman-Laroche complied and FDA 
deemed the data satisfactory.
51 
Orlistat is unlike other obesity medications since it decreases fat absorption rather than 
acting directly on appetite.
52 Its prescription use (120 mg dose under the name Xenical) was 
approved in 1999, and it became available in a half-dose over-the-counter form (60 mg under the 
name Alli) in 2007. When taken with meals, orlistat can prevent absorption of up to 30% of 
ingested fat.
53 In clinical trials, patients who took the Xenical-level dose of orlistat three times a 
day experienced 9% weight loss over the course of one year, compared to 6% among patients 
who received a placebo.
54 Orlistat is not an ideal weight-loss drug because of its limited efficacy 
and common unpleasant gastrointestinal side effects, such as flatulence, fecal incontinence, and 
oily rectal discharge.
55 To minimize these side effects, the sponsor advises consumers to adopt a 
low-fat, reduced-calorie diet.
56 Additionally, following FDA investigation of post-marketing 
reports of rare but severe liver injury, both Xenical and Alli must now carry a warning.
57 
b.  FDA FAILURES 
                                                 
50 Letter from James Bilstad, Director, Office of Drug Evaluation II, Food and Drug Administration, to Peggy Jack, 
Program Director- Drug Regulatory Affairs, Hoffman-LaRoche (May 12, 1998) available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/99/020766a_xenical_admindocs_corres_P1.pdf 
51 Memorandum from Solomon Sobel, Director, Division of Metabolic and Endocrine Drug Products, Food and 
Drug Administration, Memorandum to the File NDA 20-766 Xenical capsules (Orlistat) (Apr. 19, 1999) available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/99/020766a_xenical_admindocs_corres_P1.pdf 
52 See Ioannides-Demos, supra note 27. 
53 Kaplan, supra note 31. 
54 Id. 
55 Kaplan, supra note 31. 
56 GlaxoSmithKline, Alli Side Effects, http://www.myalli.com/About_alli/treatment_effects.aspx.  
57 Food and Drug Administration, FDA Drug Safety Communication: Completed safety review of Xenical/Alli 
(orlistat) and severe liver injury (May 26, 2010) available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm213038.htm     9 
FDA’s recent reticence to approve new anti-obesity medications is perhaps best 
explained by the recent history of withdrawals of dangerous and controversial drugs.
58 
i.  Fen-Phen (1997) and Dexfenfluramine (Redux) (1997) 
In the early 1980s, scientists discovered that serotonin deficiency might be a 
physiological cause of obesity.
59 Some individuals taking SSRI-type anti-depressants that 
increase the amount of serotonin in the brain have experienced weight loss as a side effect of the 
medication.
60 
Fenfluramine, a serotonin reuptake inhibitor, was approved by FDA in 1973 as a short-
term treatment for obesity.
61 Fenfluramine is composed of two chemicals, dexfenfluramine, an 
appetite suppressant, and levofenfluramine, which induces drowsiness. Because of the 
undesirable side effects caused by the levofenfluramine and the limited weight loss produced, 
fenfluramine was not a particularly popular drug.
62 In the 1980s, an enterprising scientist, Dr. 
Michael Weintraub, discovered that phentermine, an approved short-term anti-obesity treatment, 
counteracted the drowsiness-inducing properties of fenfluramine.
63 The combination suppressed 
patients’ appetites while increasing their metabolism. Dr. Weintraub published a number of 
studies extolling the effectiveness of the “fen-phen” combination in producing significant 
                                                 
58 FDA has also taken action to remove harmful dietary supplements promoting weight loss from the market, 
including Ephedra (withdrawn 2006) and phenylpropanolamine (withdrawn 2000), however for the purposes of this 
paper, I will solely focus on drugs. 
59 J.J. Wurtman, The Involvement of Brain Serotonin in Excessive Carbohydrate Snacking by Obese Carbohydrate 
Cravers, 84 Journal of the American Dietetic Association 1004 (1984). Notably, this is also one of the first studies 
that pointed to the use of d-fenfluramine as a weight loss aid. 
60 D.J. Goldstein, et al., Fluoxetine: a Randomized Clinical Trial in the Treatment of Obesity.18 International 
Journal of Obesity and Related Metabolic Disorder 129 (1994), finding that 60 mg of Prozac per day resulted in a 
statistically significant greater mean weight loss than placebo during the first 28 weeks of treatment. There was no 
difference, however, between the fluoxetine and placebo groups at 52 weeks. 
61 Food and Drug Administration Questions and Answers about Withdrawal of Fenfluramine (Pondimin) and 
Dexfenfluramine (Redux) (Sept. 18, 1997), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm180078.htm. 
62 Kate Cohen, PBS Frontline: Fen Phen Nation, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/prescription/hazard/fenphen.html. 
63 Michael Weintraub, et al., A Double-Blind Clinical Trial in Weight Control: Use of Fenfluramine and 
Phentermine Alone and in Combination, 144 Archive of Internal Medicine 1143 (1984).     10 
weight-loss. In one of his studies, patients experienced a thirty-one pound reduction in body 
weight in the first thirty-four weeks of treatment.
64 While the weight loss produced by fen-phen 
was typically less than the phentermine-only regimen, the combination nonetheless produced 
significant weight loss and appetite control while minimizing the adverse side effects caused by 
either of the drugs taken alone.
65 
Weintraub aggressively marketed his study results, sending reprints to doctors’ offices 
across the nation. By February 1995, the public became aware of his research on fen-phen due to 
articles published in Allure and Reader’s Digest. 
66  
Around the same time, Servier, the French sponsor of fenfluramine, discovered a way to 
isolate dexfenfluramine from the drowsiness-causing levofenfluramine. It sold the U.S. rights to 
the drug to a biotech startup who then licensed the drug to Wyeth-Ayers, to be marketed as 
“Redux.”
67 The NDA for Redux was submitted to FDA in 1995. After reviewing the evidence, 
the Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee initially recommended non-
approval of the drug in a five to three vote, citing safety concerns in light of a newly published 
study that linked fenfluramine derivatives to primary pulmonary hypertension.
68 A new meeting 
was held in November 1995 to reconsider the drug and it was approved at that meeting, 
contingent on long-term post-marketing studies of efficacy and cardiovascular effects.
69 Some 
anti-Redux critics have alleged that this meeting was suspiciously rescheduled to occur during an 
                                                 
64 Michael Weintraub, et al., Long-Term Weight Control Study I (Weeks 0 to 34), 51 Clinical Pharmacology and 
Therapeutics 586 (1992). Weeks 1 through 210 were published in this journal throughout 1992. 
65 Weintraub, supra note 63. 
66 Cohen, supra note 62. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Minutes of Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Endocrinologic and 
Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee Nov. 16, 1995, at 287.      11 
international neurosciences meeting attended by many of the members of the committee who had 
voted against Redux.
70  
Fen-phen, the combination of phentermine and either fenfluramine or dexfenfluramine, 
was never submitted in a new drug application to FDA.
71 Instead, the combination was 
prescribed “off-label” by physicians and weight loss clinics around the country both for the 
clinically obese and people trying to lose those last few pounds.
72 It is estimated that six million 
Americans took fen-phen before fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine were eventually pulled from 
the market.
73 In 1996 alone, the total number of prescriptions in the United States for 
fenfluramine and phentermine exceeded 18 million.
74 
There were early warning signs that fenfluramine posed significant long-term health 
risks. Studies from the 1970s showed that even a single dose of fenfluramine administered to rats 
produced long-term serotonin reduction.
75 Other early studies showed that use of appetite 
suppressants generally tended to produce primary pulmonary hypertension (PPH), a rare but life-
threatening cardiovascular disease that leads to heart failure and death within 2.5 years of 
diagnosis.
76 One appetite suppressant, Aminorex, approved in Europe, caused death in 50% of 
individuals who developed PPH as a result of taking the drug.
77 In 1995, the International 
Primary Pulmonary Hypertension Study found that after three months using fenfluramine or 
                                                 
70 Apryl A. Ference, Rushing to Judgment on Fen-Phen and Redux, 9 Albany Law Journal of Science and 
Technology 77, 84 (1998) citing Michael D. Lemonick et al., The New Miracle Drug? There's Great Excitement 
About Redux, the First Diet Pill Approved by the FDA in 23 Years. But It's Hardly the Ideal Way to Lose Weight, 
Time, Sept. 23, 1996, at 61, 63. 
71 Food and Drug Administration Questions and Answers about Withdrawal of Fenfluramine (Pondimin) and 
Dexfenfluramine (Redux) (Sept. 18, 1997), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm180078.htm. 
72 Gina Kolata, How Fen-Phen, A Diet “Miracle,” Rose and Fell, N.Y Times Late Edition, September 23, 1997. 
73 Id. 
74 Heidi M. Connolly, et al., Valvular Heart Disease Associated with Fenfluramine-Phentermine, 337 New England 
Journal of Medicine 581 (1997). 
75 Una D. McCann et al., Brain Serotonin Neurotoxicity and Primary Pulmonary Hypertension from Fenfluramine 
and Dexfenfluramine: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 278 JAMA 666, 667 (1997). 
76 Id. 
77 Gregory D. Curfman, Diet Pills Redux, 337 New Eng. J. Med. 629 (1997).     12 
dexfenfluramine, patients were ten times more likely to develop PPH. Subjects who took the 
drugs for more than three months were twenty times more likely to develop the disease.
78 
  Serious concerns about the safety of fen-phen and Redux began to arise in the late 1990s. 
In July 1997, a group of doctors from the Mayo Clinic published a study reporting the incidence 
of heart valve disease in twenty-four women who had taken fen-phen for an average of twelve 
months.
79 Eight of the women in the study had also developed PPH.
80 Following publication of 
the study, FDA issued a public health advisory that described the Mayo Clinic findings and 
published a letter in the New England Journal of Medicine describing additional cases. By that 
time 100 cases of heart valve disease resulting from the use of fen-phen had been reported to 
FDA.
81  
The following month, FDA required phentermine, fenfluramine, and dexfenfluramine 
sponsors to include a black box warning on their packaging to make consumers aware of the 
drugs’ association with valvular disease. FDA also noted that the drugs had been approved only 
for short-term use and for people who were significantly obese.
82 
During this time, FDA conducted its own studies of patients taking Redux or fen-phen. 
The study revealed that that about 30% of subjects developed heart valve abnormalities.
83 Based 
on these study results, FDA concluded in September 1997 that fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine 
must be immediately withdrawn from the market.
84 FDA explained that the PPH problem was 
not discovered earlier because it was thought to be a highly unusual drug reaction, and thus 
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wasn’t typically screened for in human clinical testing.
85 However, the Endocrinologic and 
Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee was aware of the International Primary Pulmonary 
Hypertension Study results when it decided to approve Redux.
86 
Following the withdrawal of fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine from the market, 
individual and class action lawsuits were filed against the manufacturers of those drugs, which 
were consolidated into a multi-district litigation.
87 By 1999, the plaintiffs and defense lawyers 
had negotiated a settlement agreement worth nearly five billion dollars that released the 
manufacturers from liability on most claims (notably excepting PPH claims) and provided 
plaintiffs with a cash or medical services benefit.
88 Litigation over fen-phen continues, with the 
manufacturer expecting to pay a total of twenty billion dollars to resolve the litigation.
89 
ii.  Sibutramine (Meridia) (2010) 
FDA approved Sibutramine, marketed under the name Meridia, in November 1997,
90 
shortly after fen-phen and Redux were recalled. Sibutramine acted by preventing the reuptake of 
norepinepherine and serotonin. But unlike fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine, sibutramine did 
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not release serotonin from cells. Also unlike fen-phen, no PPH or heart valve problems were 
reported in clinical trials.
91 
Because of its apparent safety and efficacy, sibutramine quickly became one of the most 
popularly-prescribed weight loss medications. In clinical trials, patients treated with sibutramine 
experienced an average weight loss of five to eight percent, compared to two to four percent 
weight loss among patients receiving placebo.
92 It appeared to be most effective during the first 
six to twelve months of treatment. When treatment was extended for up to two years, there was 
an average regain of about half the weight initially lost.
93  
These weight loss results were accompanied by some hefty side effects. Ten to fifteen 
percent of patients on sibutramine experienced hypertension that had to be managed by 
hypertensive therapy. 
94 Three percent of patients discontinued the drug because of uncontrolled 
hypertension
95 and attrition rates in sibutramine studies were approximately thirty to forty 
percent.
96   
FDA was well aware of these risks. During review of the sibutramine NDA, a blood 
pressure expert retained by FDA found that the drug increased blood pressure, but concluded that 
the drug’s risk-benefit balance would probably only be unfavorable in obese patients with 
uncontrolled hypertension, coronary artery disease, congestive heart failure, stroke, or cardiac 
arrhythmias.
97 In light of these data, eight of the nine members of the Endocrinologic and 
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Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee agreed that the drug’s effect on blood pressure was 
clinically important. In balancing this risk against the potential benefits as an effective weight 
loss drug, the Committee split 5-4 against recommending approval.
98 Prior to rendering a final 
decision on the NDA, FDA requested further analyses of the clinical trial blood pressure data. 
Based on these findings, FDA decided to approve the drug at low and medium doses.
99 
Early FDA communication about sibutramine’s safety indicated that there was an 
increased risk of cardiovascular events such as heart attack, stroke, and cardiovascular death.
100 
Following two sibutramine-related deaths in Britain, the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) 
demanded a long-term trial in patients at high risk of cardiovascular disease. Preliminary results 
from the SCOUT study indicated that sibutramine was associated with a higher incidence of 
cardiovascular events (14% vs. 12% on placebo).
101  Based on these findings, EMEA concluded 
that further marketing of sibutramine should be suspended,
102 but FDA decided to keep the drug 
on the market with a stronger warning label noting that sibutramine should not be used by people 
who have a history of stroke or heart attacks and uncontrolled blood pressure.
103  
FDA acknowledged that it was aware of potential cardiovascular risks when it approved 
Meridia. At that time, FDA believed that these risks were monitorable and were outweighed by 
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Meridia’s weight loss benefits.
104 The final results of the SCOUT study indicated a 16% increase 
in the risk of non-fatal heart attack, non-fatal stroke, resuscitation after cardiac arrest, and 
cardiovascular death among patients who took Meridia.
 105 Furthermore, by the end of the five-
year clinical trial, Meridia was only 2.5% more effective in weight loss than placebo.
106 After 
reviewing the new clinical trial data demonstrating a significantly increased risk of 
cardiovascular events associated with the drug, FDA concluded in October 2010 that the benefits 
of Meridia outweighed the risks, and asked the manufacturer to withdraw the drug from the 
market.
107 Thus, another drug that had initially seemed very promising was taken off the market 
due to the unacceptable health risks posed. 
IV. AN EXAMINATION OF THREE RECENTLY-REJECTED WEIGHT LOSS 
NDAS 
a.  THE LONG ROAD FROM DRUG DEVELOPMENT TO APPROVAL 
  Drug development is an expensive and lengthy process. It can take ten to fifteen years, 
on average, for a new drug to get from initial chemical synthesis to FDA approval and it 
regularly costs over a billion dollars to bring a drug to market.
108 
  A manufacturer must first obtain FDA pre-market approval indicating that the drug is 
safe, effective, and properly labeled. In order to prove that the drug meets these criteria, the 
manufacturer must conduct clinical and non-clinical animal and human testing and submit their 
results to FDA in the form of a New Drug Application (NDA).  The NDA consists of a summary, 
followed by information on: chemistry, manufacturing and controls; non-clinical pharmacology 
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and toxicology; human pharmokinetics and bioavailability; microbiology; clinical data; statistics; 
and proposed labeling.
109  The application is often developed after extensive consultation with 
FDA, which can help the sponsor understand and meet the agency’s expectations and preview 
the issues that will likely be raised during review. 
110 
  Once the application has been filed and is accepted by FDA, a review team evaluates the 
study results and procedures in order to determine if the findings are valid and that the drug is 
safe and effective.  When reviewing weight loss drugs, FDA often chooses to convene an 
Advisory Committee of outsiders who critique both the sponsor’s and the agency’s findings. The 
Committee pays heightened attention to the drug’s risks and efficacy and develops a non-binding 
recommendation of approval or non-approval.
111 FDA usually takes an Advisory Committee’s 
advice, but it is not required to do so.
112 
  If FDA agrees with the Advisory Committee’s determination that the benefits of the 
drug outweigh its risks, then the drug will be approved. If FDA and the Committee believe that 
the risks outweigh the benefits or if FDA disagrees with the Committee’s recommendation for 
approval, FDA will issue a Complete Response Letter indicating that the agency cannot approve 
the application in its present form. The letter will explain the agency’s reasoning and may 
request additional studies or notify the sponsor of other issues requiring remediation.  Upon 
receiving the letter, the sponsor can meet with agency officials and decide to correct the 
deficiencies or withdraw the application.
113 
b.  GUIDELINES FOR APPROVAL OF A WEIGHT LOSS DRUG 
                                                 
109 Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 355 (a)-(b)(2010); Hutt, supra note 108, at 676-7. 
110 Hutt, supra note 108, at 683. 
111 Food and Drug Administration, The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs are Safe and Effective, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm. 
112 Id. 
113 Id.     18 
  In 2007, the FDA Advisory Committee on Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs issued 
draft guidance on weight management drugs.
114 The guidance presents the Advisory 
Committee’s view on a topic and suggestions for sponsors who plan to submit a NDA for a new 
drug or therapeutic biologic. First, the drug must be for individuals with BMI of thirty or greater 
or twenty-seven or greater if the obesity is accompanied by weight-related co-morbidities.
115 
Second, studies must last longer than a year in order to demonstrate the efficacy of the drug in 
maintaining weight loss.
116 Phase 1 and 2 clinical trials should include a broad range of doses in 
order to determine the no-effect and maximally tolerated doses and to differentiate the efficacy 
of all doses versus placebo. Studies should also identify the effects by dose on common weight-
related co-morbidities.
 117  
  Phase 3 clinical trials should be randomized, double-blind, and placebo-controlled and 
contain lifestyle modification programs that would be practicable in the real world were the drug 
to gain FDA approval.
118 A drug’s efficacy will be assessed by the difference in mean percent 
weight loss between active-product and the placebo-treated group and by the proportion of 
subjects who lost at least five percent of their initial body weight in the active-product versus 
placebo-treated group.
119 Studies should also examine the drug’s effect on blood pressure and 
pulse, lipids, fasting glucose and insulin, HbA1c in Type 2 diabetics, and waist circumference.
120 
A drug is considered effective if either the difference in mean weight loss between the 
active-product and placebo-treated groups is at least five percent and the difference is 
statistically significant or if the proportion of subjects who lose greater than or equal to five 
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percent of baseline body weight in the active-product group is at least thirty-five percent, is 
approximately double the proportion in the placebo group, and the difference between groups is 
statistically significant. Improvements in weight-related co-morbidities are also considered.
121 
When the sponsor has combined products, studies should compare the efficacy and safety of the 
combination drug versus its individual components and placebo.
122 
The sponsor must also show that the drug is safe, through routine safety monitoring of 
adverse events or by specialized safety assessments if there is a known risk. If the drug acts on 
the central nervous system, the sponsor must show that there is no significant potential for 
abuse.
123  
c.  RECENT REJECTED NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS 
  When it comes to anti-obesity drugs, the risk-benefit calculus is far from clear. Therefore, 
a “yes” or “no” vote alone is hardly indicative of a committee member’s confidence of the drug.  
A review of the transcripts of the Advisory Committee meeting sheds much light on the 
members’ thinking, exposing their skepticism of a drug’s efficacy and uncertainty about its true 
risk profile.  
i.  Qnexa (July 2010) 
Qnexa is composed of low doses of two already-approved drugs, topiramate, an anti-
seizure medication that can increase satiety and alter taste,
124 and phentermine, the short-term 
weight loss medication discussed above. Vivus, the sponsor, submitted the NDA to FDA in 
December 2009. 
125 
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FDA found the drug’s weight loss efficacy satisfactory.
126 In one study of 200 subjects 
treated for a six month period, Qnexa-treated subjects lost an average of twenty-five pounds, 
compared to less than five pounds on placebo and ten to thirteen pounds on mono-therapy of the 
medication’s component pharmaceuticals.
127,128 In Phase 3 clinical trials, subjects taking the mid-
level dose of Qnexa experienced an average of 8.5% weight loss and 9.2% on the high dose 
formulation. Treatment with the combination drug resulted in three percent greater weight loss 
than the component drugs.
 129  Moreover, over the course of one year, Qnexa achieved a five 
percent greater weight loss than placebo.
130  Thus, the guidance document’s standard for weight-
loss drugs was met. 
FDA’s reluctance to approve Qnexa stemmed from safety concerns, most notably 
psychiatric adverse events, cognitive adverse events, metabolic acidosis, cardiovascular safety, 
and the teratogenicity of topiramate.
131 In reviewing Qnexa’s NDA, the Advisory Committee 
was “serious[ly] concern[ed]” about the increased incidence of depression among patients who 
took Qnexa in clinical trials.
132 Sleep disorders, anxiety, and depression were responsible for 
twenty-six percent of adverse event-related discontinuances among study subjects treated with 
Qnexa.
133 High dose-treated subjects were twice as likely to experience psychiatric adverse 
events in comparison to subjects receiving placebo.
134 As for cognitive adverse events, Qnexa-
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treated subjects were four times more likely to experience these.
135 The most significant 
cognitive adverse events were impaired attention and delayed memory; both are well-established 
side effects of topiramate.
136  
  The committee was also concerned about the dearth of data on the risks involved with co-
administration of other psycho-active medicines, metabolic acidosis, and increased heart rate.
137 
Unlike the fen-phen combination, however, Qnexa did not significantly increase the likelihood of 
serious cardiac adverse events.
138  
  Ironically, even the lack of effective alternative anti-obesity pharmaceuticals posed a 
concern to some of the committee members who voted against recommending approval:  
[They] expressed an agreement that the public health consequences were too great to 
warrant approval, considering the risks associated with [phentermine/topiramate] and the 
likelihood that the heavy demand for weight loss pharmacotherapy will result in many 
patients exceeding dosing limitations to maximize weight loss.
139 
 
This catch-22 pervades the regulatory environment. The committee wants drugs to be highly 
effective but fears the potential consequences when a highly-effective widely-used drug becomes 
popular. Since study subjects who discontinued using Qnexa gained back almost all of the 
weight lost, the drug was basically a life-long obesity treatment. Advisory Committee members 
were unconvinced that Qnexa was safe in the long-term, especially because of its effect on heart 
rate.
140  
  Despite study subject testimony that Qnexa acted like “instant willpower”,
 ceased their 
cravings for food, and caused dramatic weight loss, the Advisory Committee did not recommend 
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approval of the NDA.
 141 It was evident that the fen-phen ordeal loomed in their memories; 
indeed the words “fen-phen” or “fenfluramine” appear seven times in the Advisory Committee 
meeting transcript. This concern was heightened in light of FDA’s recent experience with 
Avandia, an FDA-approved diabetes medication that has been associated with an increased risk 
of heart attacks. Five days before the Advisory Committee met to review Qnexa, the media was 
ablaze with reports that Avandia’s sponsor had withheld from FDA a study showing these risks 
in order to gain approval. 
142  
In its decision to reject Qnexa, FDA sent a message to industry that it was going to begin 
paying increased attention to a drug’s risk- benefit profile. Efficacy alone would not suffice. One 
committee member positively cited FDA’s decision to withhold approval on rimonabant, a 
weight loss drug that was taken off the market in Europe due to its association with increased 
risk of suicide.
143  Another commented, “While I'm very sympathetic to the desires of those who 
are seeking treatment options for this disease, I'm also equally concerned about the erosion of the 
public's trust every time we approve a drug and don't get it right the first time.”
144 Since obese 
individuals tend to have high heart rates, the committee was most seriously concerned about 
Qnexa’s cardiovascular effects, especially the long-term effects of high pulse rates and resultant 
cardiovascular adverse events like congestive heart failure.
145  
  Indeed, most of the committee members explained that they had a difficult time balancing 
Qnexa’s proven efficacy—“superior to anything that’s on the market”
146 — against its serious 
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potential risks.
147 Many of the members expressed their desire for more long-term studies to fully 
explore these risks
148 and likened approval of the drug at this point to a “public health 
experiment”
 149 due to the high potential for use by inappropriate (i.e., non-obese) populations 
and the minimal data on subgroups, such as gender and ethnicity, in addition to its likely use 
over long periods of time.   
In its complete response letter to Vivus, FDA asked for a clinical and safety update 
evaluating topiramate’s and phentermine/topiramate’s teratogenic potential, a labeling change, 
and a detailed plan and strategy to evaluate and mitigate the risk of teratogenicity among woman 
taking the drug.
150 FDA also requested in an End-of-Review meeting that Vivus determine the 
feasibility of analyzing existing healthcare databases to determine the incidence of oral cleft in 
the children of women treated with topiramate for migraine.
151 
FDA’s safety concerns surrounding Qnexa were ultimately borne out; eight months after 
rejecting the combination drug, FDA warned consumers that topiramate, one of the component 
drugs, had an increased risk for oral clefts in infants born to woman treated with topiramate 
during pregnancy.
152  This news caused a ten percent drop in Vivus stock. 
But Vivus has not given up on Qnexa yet. Vivus submitted a Marketing Authorization 
Application with the European Medicine Agency for Qnexa in December 2010.
153 The company 
has completed Phase 2 clinical trials on the drug’s efficacy for treatment of obstructive sleep 
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apnea and diabetes.
154 Given FDA’s recent warning about topiramate, it is unclear if Vivus will 
succeed in resurrecting Qnexa. 
ii.  Lorcaserin (September 2010) 
  Lorcaserin is a selective serotonin 2c receptor agonist that reduces body weight by 
mimicking the effects of serotonin, thus decreasing food intake, increasing satiety and reducing 
pre-meal hunger and snacking. Unlike fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine, which acted similarly 
but engaged all fourteen serotonin receptors, lorcaserin avoids receptors associated with an 
increased risk of valvulopathy.
155 
  Arena Pharmaceuticals, the drug’s sponsor, submitted the NDA in December 2009 as a 
long-term treatment for obesity.
156 The Advisory Committee reviewed lorcaserin’s NDA just one 
day after reviewing the final SCOUT data on sibutramine that revealed a fifteen percent 
increased risk of heart attack. It is unsurprising, then, that the Advisory Committee displayed 
heightened levels of caution regarding safety. One FDA official preceded his presentation on 
Lorcaserin’s safety and efficacy by reminding the Advisory Committee of the history of unsafe 
weight loss drugs.
157  
  Patients in the Phase 3 clinical trials were administered the drug and placed on a strict 
diet and exercise regimen.
158 Nearly fifty-percent (47.5%) of patients taking lorcaserin 
experienced five percent weight loss, compared to twenty to twenty-five percent of patients in 
the placebo groups.
159 Therefore, lorcaserin met the guidance document requirement that a 
weight management drug produce a five percent reduction in baseline body weight among at 
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least thirty-five percent of subjects treated with the drug, and that that proportion be 
approximately double the proportion of subjects losing five percent of their body weight in the 
placebo group.
160 Twenty-two percent of subjects taking lorcaserin lost ten percent of their 
bodyweight or more.
161 Lorcaserin also caused modest improvements in blood pressure, lipids, 
and fasting blood glucose.
162 
  Despite meeting one of the efficacy requirements, the Advisory Committee nonetheless 
characterized the weight loss produced as “minimal.”
163 Most patients on lorcaserin lost between 
twelve and seventeen pounds,
164 only about three percent more than that of placebo.
165 
Moreover, lorcaserin did not appear to be significantly more effective in maintaining a five 
percent weight loss in patients who continued to take the drug versus those who switched to 
placebo; sixty-eight percent of patients who remained on lorcaserin maintained a five percent 
weight loss, compared to fifty percent of patients who switched from lorcaserin to placebo.
166  
  As for lorcaserin’s safety, the Advisory Committee was very concerned about the 
increased incidence of tumors among rats in animal studies. Multiple tumors were found in male 
rats exposed to seventeen times the clinical dose.
167 Of most concern to the committee was that 
the drug caused mammary tumors among both sexes even among the lowest dose tested on 
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animals, which was near clinical exposure.
168 The number of tumors and number of deaths 
related to these tumors increased with dose.
169 
  The Committee was unsure of how to translate this data to humans, given the possibility 
that the tumors may be due to a rodent-specific mechanism that would not affect humans. In two-
year clinical trials, the study investigators did not find a consistent increase in neoplasms in 
patients treated with lorcaserin compared to patients given placebo (2.5% and 2.3%, 
respectively).
170 Given the discrepancy in animal versus human results, the Committee felt 
“unsettled” about the tumor issue.
171 
  With respect to other risks, lorcaserin was not associated with an increased risk of 
valvulopathy over a two-year period,
172 but some members of the Advisory Committee took 
issue with the sponsor’s statistical analysis.
173 Nor was the drug associated with increased 
suicidal ideation.
174 However, more patients taking lorcaserin experienced alterations in physical 
sensation and abnormal dreams or nightmares.
175 Patients on lorcaserin experienced three times 
more cognitive-related adverse events than patients receiving placebo. Most of these were related 
to memory, attention, and confusion.
176 
  The Committee felt that the lorcaserin clinical trials may have overestimated the real 
benefits and underestimated the risks due to the large number of exclusion criteria.  Persons with 
diabetes, uncontrolled hypertension, recent heart attack or stroke, recent major depression or 
other psychiatric disease requiring medication, or who met the FDA definition of valvulopathy 
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were excluded.
177 Twenty percent of study subjects had a history of hypertension,
178 compared to 
nearly sixty-five percent of obese and overweight individuals who take weight loss medication in 
the real world.
179  
  The Advisory Committee voted 5-9 that the potential benefits of Lorcaserin outweighed 
the potential risks when used long-term. Specifically, the marginal weight loss among 
unrepresentative study population would likely translate into even smaller weight loss when used 
in the “real world.”
180 There was also a labeling concern, since many populations that would use 
the drug (e.g., diabetics, hypertensives) were not studied.
181 Even though the company was 
currently conducting a study of diabetics, the study population was not sufficiently large to allow 
for adequate study of the drug’s efficacy and risks.
182 
  If approved, the Committee recommended that Arena conduct a post-marketing trial to 
determine the benefits of weight loss among patients afflicted with a number of associated 
medical conditions. Most notably, the Committee also wanted a larger trial of several thousand 
patients to more effectively assess the drug’s efficacy and risk to benefits profile.
183 Such a study 
would be very expensive; some estimate that the cost per patient of running Phase 3 clinical 
studies of new drugs runs over twenty-six thousand dollars.
184 
  In response to FDA’s concerns about the mammary and brain tumors in rats, Arena is 
developing a three-month protocol to determine whether the tumors are malignant or benign and 
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the biological causation mechanism. FDA has requested an additional one-year study, but Arena 
hopes to calm their concerns with the short-term study and re-file the NDA by yearend 2011.
185 
iii.  Contrave (December 2010) 
  Contrave, like Qnexa, is a combination of two FDA-approved drugs, naltrexone, an 
opioid receptor agonist often used for alcohol and opioid addiction, and bupropion, an anti-
depressant that inhibits the reuptake of norepinepherine-dopamine that alone can cause 
significant weight loss. Orexigen Therapeutics, the drug’s sponsor, submitted the NDA to FDA 
in March 2010 for the long-term treatment of overweight and obesity. In developing its 
submission, Orexigen was especially sensitive in following FDA’s draft guidance and periodic 
advice as strictly as possible.
186 
  Contrave did not meet the first criterion for efficacy – that individuals taking the drug 
lose five percent or more of their body weight compared to placebo. In clinical studies, subjects 
taking Contrave over the course of fifty-six weeks lost 6.1% of their body weight compared to 
1.3% of body weight among subjects taking placebo.
187 It did meet the second criterion that at 
least thirty-five percent of study subjects lost five percent of their initial body weight or more, 
double the proportion in the placebo group, and the difference between the groups was 
statistically significant.
188 In studies, between forty-five and fifty-six percent of subjects taking 
Contrave lost five percent of their body weight or more, in contrast to between sixteen and 
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nineteen percent of subjects taking placebo.
189 Additionally, subjects taking Contrave 
experienced significant improvements in weight-related quality of life, mainly attributable to 
increased physical function and self-esteem.
190 Subjects participating in Orexigen’s studies were 
also subjected to an intense behavioral modification plan, including group therapy.
191 A 
remarkable twenty percent of placebo subjects lost ten percent or more of their body weight 
compared to about six percent of subjects in the placebo groups in the other trials.
192 
  One of the Advisory Committee members expressed frustration with Contrave’s limited 
efficacy, typical of most weight-loss drugs. A five to ten percent reduction in body weight over 
the course of one year is considered a beneficial effect, even though the patient is still nowhere 
near a normal weight. Moreover, the pace of weight loss mimics a curve, with losing most of 
their weight by month six, continuing to lose weight at a slower pace through month twelve, and 
then plateauing or beginning to regain weight after a year, just like many other weight-loss 
treatments.
193 
  Approximately half (51% to 55%) of subjects in the active-product and placebo groups 
completed the Phase 3 study.
194 The most common adverse events that led to study withdrawal 
were nausea, headache, vomiting, dizziness, and insomnia.
195 
  FDA was also concerned about Contrave’s safety. Bupropion, one of the drug’s 
components, inhibits norepinephrine reuptake, which can increase blood pressure and pulse. 
Twice as many subjects treated with Contrave had pulse increases above 100 beats per minute in 
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two consecutive visits than subjects receiving placebo.
196 Subjects treated with Contrave also had 
small but significant increases in systolic and diastolic blood pressure.
197 FDA officials 
evaluating the sponsor’s clinical studies felt that there were an insufficient number of major 
adverse cardiac events to effectively judge Contrave’s cardiovascular safety, a point of real 
concern.
198 This was due, in part, to the researchers’ failure to ensure that the study population 
closely mirrored the patient population at large. Specifically, only twenty-four percent of 
Contrave subjects were hypertensive,
199 as opposed to about sixty-five percent of the obese and 
overweight population who fill prescriptions for weight-loss drugs.
200 While weight-loss drug 
sponsors are not requested to include a certain percentage of hypertensives in their studies, the 
failure to do so impeded the Advisory Committee’s ability to evaluate Contrave’s cardiovascular 
risks, a serious concern in light of FDA’s recent experience with sibutramine.
201 
Moreover, the Advisory Committee felt it had inadequate information on which to 
evaluate the drug’s risks due to the high (46%) drop-out rate.
202 Members wanted to explore the 
drug’s potential association with dizziness, anxiety, seizures, increased serum creatine, and 
suicidal ideation.
203 The committee was also anxious to see the results of the sponsor’s study on 
potential cardiovascular effects among high-risk populations.
204 Eight members of the 
committee voted that a controlled clinical study on the drug’s effect on potential major cardiac 
events was necessary as a condition to approval, while eleven thought that such a study could 
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be conducted post-approval. Many of the committee members struggled with this vote.
205 
Despite these concerns, thirteen of the committee members voted to recommend approval of 
Contrave, with seven opposing the recommendation on the grounds that that given the drug’s 
“marginal” efficacy, the data simply didn’t bear out that the benefits of the drug outweighed the 
risks.
206 Even the “yes” votes were contingent on further post-approval studies.  
In recording his no vote, one of the Advisory Committee members made a comment 
that aptly summarizes FDA’s apparent position on evaluating the risk-benefit of anti-obesity 
drugs:  
There is an opportunity for us to learn from history or else we're likely to 
repeat it. Every time the regulatory agency withdraws a product from the 
market, undoubtedly, driven by its core mission to ensure public safety, 
there is a price to pay for it; erosion of public trust. We need to make sure 
that we get it right the first time.
207 
 
Despite these anxieties, the Advisory Committee voted 13-7 recommending the drug’s 
approval. Therefore, it came as a shock to when FDA informed Orexigen of its decision not to 
approve Contrave, citing concerns about the drug’s long-term cardiovascular safety. FDA 
requested that the company conduct a randomized double-blind placebo-controlled study “of 
sufficient size and duration” to demonstrate that the risk of major cardiovascular events in 
patients treated with the drug doesn’t adversely affect its risk-benefit profile.
208 Such a trial 
would be lengthy and extremely expensive.  
V.  THE IMPACT OF NON-APPROVAL 
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  The day that Orexigen announced the contents of its Complete Response Letter, a 
Forbes.com columnist proclaimed, “the field of obesity drugs is effectively dead… The clear 
lesson is that weight-loss medicines simply do not have enough of a benefit to justify any risk – 
and that this makes getting them approved just about impossible.”
209 The columnist went on to 
predict that “a lack of scientific knowledge, high regulatory hurdles, and the fact that these 
failures will keep drug companies from investing in new obesity research will probably mean 
years, if not decades, before another weight-loss drug makes it to market.”
210 
And perhaps he is right. The companies that developed Contrave, lorcaserin, and Qnexa 
are experiencing dire consequences as a result of their failed NDAs. Arena, lorcaserin’s sponsor, 
slashed twenty-five percent of its staff in the wake of FDA non-approval, hoping to save an 
annualized 13.5 million dollars.
211 Two weeks later, its CFO resigned.
212 Similarly, Orexigen 
shares fell more than seventy-two percent on the news of its non-approval.
213 Within days, the 
company announced that it was laying off forty percent of its employees in an effort to reduce 
annualized cash expenditures by five million dollars, allowing the company to focus on other 
near-term activities.
214 Other biotech companies have decided to put further anti-obesity drug 
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development on hold in light of the financial burden of Phase 3 clinical trials and the apparently 
hostile regulatory environment.
215 
But efforts to find a pharmaceutical obesity cure have not been entirely abandoned. As of 
this writing, there are still a number of drugs in the pipeline, including Phase 3 trials. For 
example, liraglutide, an antidiabetic medication, is being tested for its efficacy in the treatment of 
obesity. The manufacturer, Novo Nordisk, anticipates that the Phase 3 trials will not be 
completed until 2013.
216 Early clinical results are promising. In one study of pre-diabetic obese 
individuals, subjects on liraglutide lost nearly sixteen pounds over twenty weeks compared to a 
six pound weight loss among subjects receiving placebo.
217 Assuming that the drug is effective, 
it will likely be at least four years before it is brought to market as a weight loss treatment.  Other 
drugs in the pipeline include zonisamide plus bupropion (completed Phase 2 clinical trials),
218 
pramlintide plus metreleptin (Phase 3 trials recently suspended),
 219 and tesamorelin (in Phase 2 
trials).
220 
VI. LOOKING AHEAD 
Any new anti-obesity drug NDA will undoubtedly be subject to the Advisory 
Committee’s new stringent standards for safety and efficacy. The problem is that these 
standards haven’t yet been formally articulated. It appears that the standards are being refined 
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as FDA responds to current events. The Committee’s concern is certainly prudent and well 
founded. But it is unfair to sponsors that they can develop an NDA fully compliant with 
Industry Guidance Document requirements but still fail to meet the Committee’s and FDA’s 
new expectations. 
In a reflective moment, a committee member acknowledged concern about the potential 
impact of regulatory uncertainty on drug development efforts:  
[I]t worries me tremendously to consider the chilling effect that we might provide to the 
Industry at large and to the future development of weight loss products if we were going 
to change the rules in midstream here. It was clear that the company had responsible 
discussions with the agency at the end of Phase 2 and before beginning the Phase 3 
program. They defined the criteria and they met that [sic] criteria.
221 
 
A patient advocate shared this perspective, pointing out that sponsors had abandoned metabolic 
pipelines because of the low likelihood of gaining approval; “Our system is such that industry 
and only industry can bring products to patients. When investors say that they won't support 
their products… we as patients pay the price….”
222  
  The response to FDA’s new approach has not been entirely negative. There is a value in 
getting it right the first time; “We need to know exactly what the benefits are long-term, exactly 
what the risks are long-term before a product is approved.”
223 Setting higher standards will force 
pharmaceutical sponsors to develop drugs with increased efficacy.
224 Some have suggested that 
FDA push should sponsors to demonstrate higher efficacy but among targeted populations—thus 
creating a market “customized” to the patient’s profile and needs.
225  
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  In reviewing the transcripts of recent review processes, it appears that the Advisory 
Committee is keenly concerned about safety risks, specifically cardiovascular and cognitive 
risks. They criticize the efficacy requirements as too lax and essentially meaningless for obese 
individuals. If an obese person loses five percent of his bodyweight, he is likely still obese. 
Committee members would also like to see the study populations be more reflective of the obese 
and overweight population at large by not excluding individuals with common co-occurring 
morbidities like hypertension and diabetes. 
The Advisory Committee members view obesity as a chronic disease, one that potentially 
requires treatment over the course of a lifetime. Given these facts, they are not longer willing to 
take a “wait and see” approach to safety and are concerned with preserving FDA’s reputation.
226 
However, they are also aware that there is a gap in the market that will easily be filled with 
“quackery” if no new effective drug for long-term use is approved soon.
227  
Anti-obesity drugs are considered a secondary approach to weight loss. According to the 
Advisory Committee’s guidance,   
Lifestyle modification … is considered the cornerstone of overweight and obesity 
management. Because all drug and biological therapies impose some risk for adverse 
events, the use of a weight-management product should be contemplated only after a 
sufficient trial of lifestyle modification has failed and the risks of excess adiposity and the 
anticipated benefits of weight loss are expected to outweigh the known and unknown 
risks of treatment with a particular weight-management product.
228 
 
This view is controversial given the overwhelming evidence that lifestyle modification alone is 
an ineffective means of promoting sustained weight loss. In one study, patients who were treated 
with group lifestyle modification for six months regained over thirty percent of the lost weight in 
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the year after treatment ended. By five years out, over fifty percent of patients had gained all of 
the weight lost.
229 
  But until drug companies develop an effective anti-obesity medication with limited 
cardiovascular and central nervous system side effects, obesity can only be treated through a 
combination of surgical and lifestyle modification approaches.   
  Severely obese people can choose to undergo bariatric surgery, usually opting for gastric 
bypass or gastric banding surgery. In gastric bypass surgery, the stomach is divided to create a 
small upper pouch that restricts the volume of food that can be eaten. It is indicated for morbidly 
obese people who haven’t been able to lose weight through diet and exercise and are suffering 
from an obesity-related health condition. 
Another option for otherwise healthy but severely obese individuals (BMI greater than or 
equal to thirty) and moderately obese individuals (BMI greater than or equal to thirty-five) with 
an obesity-related health problem is gastric banding surgery. Gastric banding surgery is a 
procedure where an inflatable silicone ring is placed around one’s stomach, thereby restricting 
the quantity of food than a person can eat. In one study, patients experienced a fifty-two percent 
weight loss for up to six years after surgery.
230 FDA recently approved an expansion of the 
procedure to individuals with a BMI of thirty or more and an obesity-related health condition.
231 
This means that clinically obese but otherwise healthy persons are unable to qualify for most 
surgical treatments, leaving the majority of obese people with weight loss drugs and lifestyle 
modification as their only treatment options. 
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  In rejecting Contrave, one Advisory Committee member commented that we still have a 
long way to go in understanding obesity and that the fact that we don’t have an effective 
pharmacotherapy on the market is not enough of a reason to approve an inferior product. He 
urged that “a very vigorous new type of research campaign … be launched in this country to 
understand this illness along new and different lines, pointing carefully to genetic and early 
environmental interactions…. [A]ttributing the problem to our bad behavior, and looking for 
drugs that will sort of push us along a bit is not going to be the final answer.”
232 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Are we doing obese Americans a disservice because there is a diversity of patient 
profiles and needs but only one drug for the long-term treatment of obesity on the market? One 
obesity advocate chided the Advisory Committee, “To spike all of these drugs simply because 
there's not a perfect drug … is a terrible miscarriage of your duties.”
233 According to another 
diabetes and obesity patient advocate, patients and providers are losing trust in FDA’s ability to 
improve life for obese people due to the hostile regulatory environment.
234 We must also 
question the Committee’s premise that five percent weight loss is insignificant among obese 
individuals.  Some bariatric physicians have reported that even a weight loss of that small 
magnitude could  
facilitat[e] lifestyle change, whether it decreases cravings, emotional eating, obsession 
with food, the noise in one's head, manages hunger; it can help break a cycle that 
prevents weight loss, moving a person to a new mindset. This results in metabolic 
improvement, decreased use of a myriad of medications, increased mobility, better self-
esteem, which, in turn, perpetuates more weight loss and improved quality of life. It is a 
critical part of the toolbox, which helps with the strong neuroendocrine redundancy that 
impedes weight loss.
235 
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Many public members attending the Advisory Committee meeting echoed this view,
236 which is 
widely shared by bariatric physicians.
237 
  Rather than being so critical of the relatively homogenous study populations in some of 
the critical trials, FDA should limit the approval of safe and efficacious drugs to use among 
individuals whose profile matches that of the clinical study population. Indeed, many 
researchers are pointing to individualized pharmacology as the future of medicine. In 
individualized medicine, the patient’s treatment is tailored to her genetic or molecular profile, 
which improves treatment efficacy and specificity and minimizes adverse events.
238 If the drug 
meets FDA guidance for safety and efficacy, its NDA should be approved.  FDA can make that 
approval contingent on labeling that prescribes the drug’s use only in a specific population. By 
permitting the use of individualized pharmacotherapy for obesity rather than a one-size-fits-all 
approach, obese patients can get the treatments that they desperately need. At the same time, 
FDA will be able to continue to protect the public’s health while beginning the arduous work of 
regaining its trust.  
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